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Turner, Léon

WILL WE KNOW THEM WHEN WE MEET THEM? HUMAN CYBORG AND NONHUMAN PERSONHOOD : with Fraser Watts and Marius Dorobantu, “The Relational Turn in Understanding Personhood: Psychological, Theological, and Computational Perspectives”; William F. Clocksin, “Guidelines for Computational Modeling of Friendship”; Michael J. Reiss, “Is It Possible That Robots Will Not One Day Become Persons?”; and Léon Turner, “Will We Know Them When We Meet Them? Human Cyborg and Non‐Human Personhood.”

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  • Media type: E-Article
  • Title: WILL WE KNOW THEM WHEN WE MEET THEM? HUMAN CYBORG AND NONHUMAN PERSONHOOD : with Fraser Watts and Marius Dorobantu, “The Relational Turn in Understanding Personhood: Psychological, Theological, and Computational Perspectives”; William F. Clocksin, “Guidelines for Computational Modeling of Friendship”; Michael J. Reiss, “Is It Possible That Robots Will Not One Day Become Persons?”; and Léon Turner, “Will We Know Them When We Meet Them? Human Cyborg and Non‐Human Personhood.” : with Fraser Watts and Marius Dorobantu, “The Relational Turn in Understanding Personhood: Psychological, Theological, and Computational Perspectives”; William F. Clocksin, “Guidelines for Computational Modeling of Friendship”; Michael J. Reiss, “Is It Possible That Robots Will Not One Day Become Persons?”; and Léon Turner, “Will We Know Them When We Meet Them? Human Cyborg and Non‐Human Personhood.”
  • Contributor: Turner, Léon
  • imprint: Open Library of the Humanities, 2023
  • Published in: Zygon®
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12923
  • ISSN: 0591-2385; 1467-9744
  • Keywords: Religious studies ; Education ; Cultural Studies
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>In this article, I assess (1) whether some cyborgs and AI robots can theoretically be considered persons; and (2) how we will know if/when they have attained personhood. Since our discourses of personhood are inherently pluralistic and our concepts of both humanness and personhood are inherently nebulous, both some cyborgs, and some AI robots, I conclude, could theoretically be considered persons depending on what, exactly, one means by “person.” The practical problem of how we distinguish them from nonpersonal AI entities is, however, both more important, and much more difficult to solve. In conversation with various secular and theological accounts of relational personhood, I argue that only by treating AI entities as persons by default might we avoid the potentially catastrophic consequences of mistakenly denying personhood to an entire group of eligible entities.</jats:p>
  • Access State: Open Access