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Townsend, Simon W.; Koski, Sonja E.; Byrne, Richard W.; Slocombe, Katie E.; Bickel, Balthasar; Boeckle, Markus; Braga Goncalves, Ines; Burkart, Judith M.; Flower, Tom; Gaunet, Florence; Glock, Hans Johann; Gruber, Thibaud; Jansen, David A. W. A. M.; Liebal, Katja; Linke, Angelika; Miklósi, Ádám; Moore, Richard; van Schaik, Carel P.; Stoll, Sabine; Vail, Alex; Waller, Bridget M.; Wild, Markus; Zuberbühler, Klaus; Manser, Marta B.

Exorcising Grice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals

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  • Media type: E-Article
  • Title: Exorcising Grice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals
  • Contributor: Townsend, Simon W.; Koski, Sonja E.; Byrne, Richard W.; Slocombe, Katie E.; Bickel, Balthasar; Boeckle, Markus; Braga Goncalves, Ines; Burkart, Judith M.; Flower, Tom; Gaunet, Florence; Glock, Hans Johann; Gruber, Thibaud; Jansen, David A. W. A. M.; Liebal, Katja; Linke, Angelika; Miklósi, Ádám; Moore, Richard; van Schaik, Carel P.; Stoll, Sabine; Vail, Alex; Waller, Bridget M.; Wild, Markus; Zuberbühler, Klaus; Manser, Marta B.
  • imprint: Wiley, 2017
  • Published in: Biological Reviews
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.1111/brv.12289
  • ISSN: 1464-7931; 1469-185X
  • Keywords: General Agricultural and Biological Sciences ; General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
  • Origination:
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  • Description: <jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title><jats:p>Language's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (<jats:italic>i</jats:italic>) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental‐state attribution, and (<jats:italic>ii</jats:italic>) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans.</jats:p>