Description:
<jats:p>Britain tightly restricts the supply of office space, creating substantial economic rents, but its development restrictions are politically administered and therefore gameable, inducing rent‐seeking activity. We find that ‘trophy architects’ (<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">TA</jats:styled-content>s)—prior winners of a lifetime achievement award—obtain more space on a given site apparently by signalling architectural merit. Analysis of 2039 office buildings shows that <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">TA</jats:styled-content>s build 14 stories taller, thereby increasing a representative site value by 152% and capturing potential economic rents of £148m. However, we argue that this apparent premium is merely compensation for the extra costs, risks and delays of using a <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">TA</jats:styled-content> to game the planning system; it is therefore an indirect measure of the deadweight costs of this form of rent‐seeking.</jats:p>