Description:
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>I discuss an objection by Margaret Wilson against Robert Brandom's interpretation of Leibniz's account of perceptual distinctness. According to Brandom, Leibniz holds that (i) the relative distinctness of a perception is a function of its inferentially articulated content and (ii) apperception, or awareness, is explicable in terms of degrees of perceptual distinctness. Wilson alleges that Brandom confuses ‘external deducibility’ <jats:italic>from</jats:italic> a perceptual state of a monad <jats:italic>to</jats:italic> the existence of properties in the world, with ‘internally accessible content’ <jats:italic>for</jats:italic> the monad in that state. Drawing on Leibniz, I develop a response to Wilson on Brandom's behalf.</jats:p>