• Media type: E-Article
  • Title: A Patent System with a Contingent Delegation Fee under Asymmetric Information
  • Contributor: Kim, Weonseek; Koo, Bonwoo
  • Published: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2012
  • Published in: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 12 (2012) 1
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.1515/1935-1682.2702
  • ISSN: 1935-1682
  • Keywords: Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) ; Economics and Econometrics
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Under the framework of a two-stage innovation process in which the first-stage innovation is commercialized by multiple firms at the second stage, this study proposes an optimal patent system for efficient commercialization by a lower cost firm when the R&amp;D costs are private information. Under the existing patent system of granting patents sequentially to successful innovators, the commercialization can be achieved by an inefficient firm (called control loss) and duplicative R&amp;D efforts may occur through competitive innovation race. This study shows that the problems of control loss and duplicative R&amp;D efforts can be prevented if the patent office grants a patent with a mandatory contingent delegation fee only to the first innovator. A carefully designed contingent fee function can induce the first innovator to internalize the patent office’s objective function, leading to efficient commercialization by a lower cost firm.</jats:p>