Description:
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p> In my paper I reconstruct J. Shklar’s arguments against legalistic positions which try to reduce the moral point of view to a model of legitimizing and applying rules. I emphasize in particular the relevance of her arguments for current metaethical debates. The paper shows that Shklar’s thought comes close to some arguments of S. Cavell, who locates the problem of how to define the relation between a rule and a case at the very center of ethical reflection. Finally I discuss how Shklar’s scepticism about any objective moral point of view corresponds with two other negativistic motives of her philosophy: a) her accusation that traditional theories of justice make invisible the perspective of the victims of injustice, and b) her thesis that injustice cannot be reduced to “a prelude, a rejection, and a collapse of justice.”</jats:p>