Description:
<p>Individual political rights and civic national identity lie at the core of American democracy, and spreading democracy is a crucial component of American grand strategy. However, American policymakers have often supported the construction of rigid, group-rights-based institutions in ethno-religious conflicts even when the parties were not demanding such institutions. The pursuit of "ethnocratic" solutions not only runs contrary to American ideals, but it is also not pragmatic, in that it enables the creation of regimes that are fragile, divided, and often dependent on outside assistance to maintain peace. This article weighs hypotheses about the sources of foreign policy decision making stemming from three contending Weberian logics of social action: instrumental rationality, normative appropriateness, and habit. Drawing on causal-process observations during crucial decision moments in Bosnia and Iraq, I argue in favor of the plausibility of habit as a driver of U.S. foreign policy. This work furthers the theoretical development of the concept of habit, offers a means of studying social habits empirically, and suggests improvements for American foreign policy in ethnic conflict.</p>