• Media type: E-Article
  • Title: Psychiatric Progress and the Assumption of Diagnostic Discrimination
  • Contributor: Tabb, Kathryn
  • imprint: University of Chicago Press, 2015
  • Published in: Philosophy of Science
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.1086/683439
  • ISSN: 0031-8248; 1539-767X
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: <p>Psychiatry’s failure to validate its diagnostic constructs is often attributed to the prioritizing of reliability over validity in the <italic>Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders</italic> (<italic>DSM</italic>). I argue that a more powerful way in which the <italic>DSM</italic> has retarded biomedical progress is by encouraging unwarranted optimism about <italic>diagnostic discrimination</italic>: the assumption that our diagnostic tests group patients together in ways that allow for relevant facts about mental disorder to be discovered. I argue that the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework, a new paradigm for classifying objects of psychiatric research, solves some of the challenges brought on by this assumption.</p>