You can manage bookmarks using lists, please log in to your user account for this.
Media type:
E-Article
Title:
Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
Contributor:
Agastya, Murali
Published:
Review of Economic Studies Ltd., 1997
Published in:
The Review of Economic Studies, 64 (1997) 3, Seite 411-426
Language:
English
ISSN:
0034-6527;
1467-937X
Origination:
Footnote:
Description:
We study the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function, we first show that all self-perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf. Following this, we provide a sufficient condition under which the society eventually learns to divide the surplus according to some core allocation, regardless of the initial history.