Buying democracy?: the political economy of foreign aid, power-sharing governments, and post-conflict political development

Medientyp: E-Book; Hochschulschrift

Titel: Buying democracy? : the political economy of foreign aid, power-sharing governments, and post-conflict political development

Beteiligte: Haaß, Felix [Verfasser:in]

Körperschaft: Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald

Erschienen: Greifswald, 2.1.2018

Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 301 Seiten); Diagramme (teilweise farbig)

Sprache: Englisch

Identifikator:

RVK-Notation: MD 8700 : Bürgerkrieg
ME 3000 : Allgemeines

Schlagwörter: Bürgerkrieg > Demokratie > Entwicklungszusammenarbeit > Friedensvertrag > Macht > Machtstruktur > Politische Ökonomie

Entstehung:

Hochschulschrift: Dissertation, Philosophische Fakultät der Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald, 2017

Anmerkungen: Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 246-272

Beschreibung: What shapes the prospect for democracy in the aftermath of civil conflicts? Some authors claim a successful transition from violence to elections mainly depends on the ability of political institutions, such as power-sharing arrangements, to mitigate the security dilemma among former battlefield adversaries. Drawing on a broader literature, others point to potential effects of foreign aid on democratic development. This predominant focus on elections and the security dilemma, however, limits our understanding in a number of ways. We do not know how the choice of post-conflict elites to hold elections is strategically intertwined with their willingness to reform other state institutions. We also have only begun to understand how post-conflict power-sharing governments function as revenue source for elites. Knowing how this economic function drives or obstructs post-conflict democratic development is particularly helpful if we shift our attention to a major source of income for post-conflict elites: foreign aid, and the democratic conditions donors attach to it. Addressing these gaps, I argue that both the economic utility from office as well as political conditionalities give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma for post-conflict elites: they can either hold elections and face uncertainty over their access to power, but secure economic rents from aid. Or they refuse to democratize, secure their hold on power, but risk losing revenues when donors withdraw aid. In this situation, their optimal strategy is to agree to democratic reforms in the area on which donors place most value, elections. But to maximize their chances of electoral victory and continued access to rents from office, elites simultaneously restrain an independent rule of law and narrowly distribute private goods to their supporters. -- From the author's summary

What shapes the prospect for democracy in the aftermath of civil conflicts? Some authors claim a successful transition from violence to elections mainly depends on the ability of political institutions, such as power-sharing arrangements, to mitigate the security dilemma among former battlefield adversaries. Drawing on a broader literature, others point to potential effects of foreign aid on democratic development. This predominant focus on elections and the security dilemma, however, limits our understanding in a number of ways. We do not know how the choice of post-conflict elites to hold elections is strategically intertwined with their willingness to reform other state institutions. We also have only begun to understand how post-conflict power-sharing governments function as revenue source for elites. Knowing how this economic function drives or obstructs post-conflict democratic development is particularly helpful if we shift our attention to a major source of income for post-conflict elites: foreign aid, and the democratic conditions donors attach to it. Addressing these gaps, I argue that both the economic utility from office as well as political conditionalities give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma for post-conflict elites: they can either hold elections and face uncertainty over their access to power, but secure economic rents from aid. Or they refuse to democratize, secure their hold on power, but risk losing revenues when donors withdraw aid. In this ...

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