Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill?

Medientyp: E-Book

Titel: Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill?

Beteiligte: Ibert, Markus [VerfasserIn]; Kaniel, Ron [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Vestman, Roine [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]

Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research

Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2017

Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.3386/w23373

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Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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Anmerkungen: Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files

Beschreibung: Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level revenues and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation to manager-level revenue and performance, highlighting the importance of the mutual fund firm

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