Cai, Jing
[VerfasserIn]
;
de Janvry, Alain
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Sadoulet, Elisabeth
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2016
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w22702
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w22702
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Beschreibung:
Many new products presumed to be privately beneficial to the poor have a high price elasticity of demand and ultimately zero take-up rate at market price. This has led governments and donors to provide subsidies to increase take-up, with the concern of trying to limit their cost. In this study, we use data from a two-year field experiment in rural China to define the optimum subsidy scheme that can insure a given take-up for a new weather insurance for rice producers. We build a model that includes the forces that are known to be determinants of insurance demand, provide reduced form confirmation of their importance, validate the dynamic model with out-of-sample predictions, and use it to conduct policy simulations. Results show that the optimum current subsidy necessary to achieve a desired take-up rate depends on both past subsidy levels and past payout rates, implying that subsidy levels should vary locally year-to-year