Brown, Gregory W.
[VerfasserIn]
;
Gredil, Oleg R.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Kaplan, Steven N.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Do Private Equity Funds Manipulate Reported Returns?
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2016
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w22493
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w22493
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Beschreibung:
Private equity funds hold assets that are hard to value. Managers may have an incentive to distort reported valuations if these are used by investors to decide on commitments to subsequent funds managed by the same firm. Using a large dataset of buyout and venture funds, we test for the presence of reported return manipulation. We find evidence that some under-performing managers boost reported returns during times when fundraising takes place. However, those managers are unlikely to raise a next fund, suggesting that investors see through much of the manipulation. In contrast, we find that top-performing funds likely understate their valuations