Casella, Alessandra
[VerfasserIn]
;
Macé, Antonin
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Laslier, Jean Francois
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Democracy for Polarized Committees
: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2016
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w22231
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w22231
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
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Beschreibung:
In polarized committees, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. Allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues restores some minority power. However, it also creates a complex strategic scenario: a hide-and-seek game between majority and minority voters that corresponds to a decentralized version of the Colonel Blotto game. We offer theoretical results and bring the game to the laboratory. The minority wins as frequently as theory predicts, despite subjects deviating from equilibrium strategies. Because subjects understand the logic of the game -- minority voters must concentrate votes unpredictably -- the exact choices are of secondary importance, a result that vouches for the robustness of the voting rule to strategic mistakes