Hoffman, Mitchell
[Verfasser:in]
;
León, Gianmarco
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Lombardi, María
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2016
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w22221
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w22221
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Beschreibung:
We study a unique quasi-experiment in Austria, where compulsory voting laws are changed across Austria's nine states at different times. Analyzing state and national elections from 1949-2010, we show that compulsory voting laws with weakly enforced fines increase turnout by roughly 10 percentage points. However, we find no evidence that this change in turnout affected government spending patterns (in levels or composition) or electoral outcomes. Individual-level data on turnout and political preferences suggest these results occur because individuals swayed to vote due to compulsory voting are more likely to be non-partisan, have low interest in politics, and be uninformed