Suárez Serrato, Juan Carlos
[Verfasser:in]
;
Zhang, Shuang
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Wang, Xiao Yu
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2016
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w21963
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w21963
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
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Mode of access: World Wide Web
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Beschreibung:
Meritocracies that aim to identify high-ability bureaucrats are less effective when performance is imperfectly observed. First, we show meritocratic governments forgo output maximization when they design incentives that screen for ability. This trade-off has empirical implications that reveal whether governments prioritize screening. We show Chinese governments used the One Child Policy to screen mayors, implying a meritocratic objective. Second, we show misreporting limits bureaucratic screening. Using a non-manipulated measure of performance, we show mayors misreported performance metrics, and that promoted mayors were not of higher ability. We thus challenge the notion that meritocratic promotions were effective substitutes for democratic institutions