Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2014
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w20656
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w20656
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Beschreibung:
During the Bretton Woods era, balance-of-payments developments, gold losses, and exchange-rate concerns had little influence on Federal Reserve monetary policy, even after 1958 when such issues became critical. The Federal Reserve could largely disregard international considerations because the U.S. Treasury instituted a number of stopgap devices--the gold pool, the general agreement to borrow, capital restraints, sterilized foreign-exchange operations--to shore up the dollar and Bretton Woods. These, however, gave Federal Reserve policymakers the latitude to focus on the domestic objectives and shifted responsibility for international developments to the Treasury. Removing the pressure of international considerations from Federal Reserve policy decisions made it easier for the Federal Reserve to pursue the inflationary policies of the late 1960s and 1970s that ultimate destroyed Bretton Woods. In the end, the Treasury's stopgap devices, which were intended to support Bretton Woods, contributed to its demise