Allen, Jason
[Verfasser:in]
;
Houde, Jean-François
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Clark, Robert
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Search Frictions and Market Power in Negotiated Price Markets
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2014
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w19883
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w19883
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Beschreibung:
This paper develops and estimates a search and bargaining model designed to measure the welfare loss associated with frictions in oligopoly markets with negotiated prices. We use the model to quantify the consumer surplus loss induced by the presence of search frictions in the Canadian mortgage market, and evaluate the relative importance of market power, inefficient allocation, and direct search costs in explaining the loss. Our results suggest that search frictions reduce consumer surplus by almost $20 per month per consumer, and that 17% of this reduction can be associated with discrimination, 30% with inefficient matching, and the remainder with the search cost