Back, Kerry
[Verfasser:in]
;
Ljungqvist, Alexander
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Li, Tao
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2013
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w19669
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w19669
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
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Beschreibung:
Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an active role in governance. We show that an increase in the liquidity of the firm's stock increases the likelihood of the large investor 'taking the Wall Street walk.' Thus, higher liquidity is harmful for governance. Empirical tests using three distinct sources of exogenous variation in liquidity confirm the negative relation between liquidity and blockholder activism