Bhattacharya, Vivek
[Verfasser:in]
;
Sweeting, Andrew
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Roberts, James W.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2013
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w19352
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w19352
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Beschreibung:
Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends non-monotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auctions with free entry for bridge-building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly