Hastings, Justine S.
[Verfasser:in]
;
Hortaçsu, Ali
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Syverson, Chad
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Sales Force and Competition in Financial Product Markets
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2013
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w18881
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w18881
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
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Beschreibung:
This paper examines how sales force impact competition and equilibrium prices in the context of a privatized pension market. We use detailed administrative data on fund manager choices and worker characteristics at the inception of Mexico's privatized social security system, where fund managers had to set prices (management fees) at the national level, but could select sales force levels by local geographic areas. We develop and estimate a model of fund manager choice where sales force can increase or decrease customer price sensitivity. We find exposure to sales force lowered price sensitivity, leading to inelastic demand and high equilibrium fees. We simulate oft-proposed policy solutions: a supply-side policy with a competitive government player and a demand-side policy which increases price elasticity. We find that demand-side policies are necessary to foster competition in social safety net markets with large segments of inelastic consumers