Zheng, Siqi
[Verfasser:in]
;
Luo, Danglun
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Kahn, Matthew E.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Sun, Weizeng
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Incentivizing China's Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2013
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w18872
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w18872
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
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Beschreibung:
China's extremely high levels of urban air, water and greenhouse gas emissions levels pose local and global environmental challenges. China's urban leaders have substantial influence and discretion over the evolution of economic activity that generates such externalities. This paper examines the political economy of urban leaders' incentives to tackle pollution issues. Based on a principal-agent framework, we present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that both the central government and the public are placing pressure on China's urban leaders to mitigate externalities. Such "pro-green" incentives suggest that many of China's cities could enjoy significant environmental progress in the near future