Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions

Medientyp: E-Book

Titel: Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance : Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions

Beteiligte: Celis, L. Elisa [Verfasser:in]; Lewis, Gregory [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Nazerzadeh, Hamid [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Mobius, Markus M. [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]

Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research

Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2012

Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.3386/w18590

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Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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Anmerkungen: Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files

Beschreibung: Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can "buy-it-now" at a posted price, or "take-a-chance" in an auction where the top d > 1 bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized allocation incentivizes high valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We analyze equilibrium behavior, and apply our analysis to advertiser bidding data from Microsoft Advertising Exchange. In counterfactual simulations, our mechanism increases revenue by 4.4% and consumer surplus by 14.5% compared to an optimal second-price auction

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