Do Hospitals Cross Subsidize?

Medientyp: E-Book

Titel: Do Hospitals Cross Subsidize?

Beteiligte: David, Guy [VerfasserIn]; Helmchen, Lorens A. [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Burns, Lawton R. [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Lindrooth, Richard [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]

Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research

Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2011

Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.3386/w17300

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Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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Anmerkungen: Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files

Beschreibung: Cross-subsidies are often considered the principal mechanism through which hospitals provide unprofitable care. Yet, hospitals' reliance on and extent of cross-subsidization are difficult to establish. We exploit entry by cardiac specialty hospitals as an exogenous shock to incumbent hospitals' profitability and in turn to their ability to cross-subsidize unprofitable services. Using patient-level data from general short-term hospitals in Arizona and Colorado before and after entry, we find that the hospitals most exposed to entry reduced their provision of services considered to be unprofitable (psychiatric, substance- abuse, and trauma care) and expanded their admissions for neurosurgery, a highly profitable service

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