de Janvry, Alain
[VerfasserIn]
;
Sadoulet, Elisabeth
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Finan, Frederico
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2010
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w16635
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w16635
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
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Beschreibung:
This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes