Bordo, Michael D.
[Verfasser:in]
;
Schwartz, Anna J.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Humpage, Owen F.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan Era
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2010
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w16345
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w16345
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Beschreibung:
The Federal Reserve abandoned foreign-exchange-market intervention because it conflicted with the System's commitment to price stability. By the early 1980s, economists generally concluded that, absent a portfolio-balance channel, sterilized foreign-exchange-market intervention did not provide central banks with a mechanism for systematically influencing exchange rates independent of their monetary policies. If intervention were to have anything other than a fleeting, hit-or-miss, effect on exchange rates, monetary policy had to support it. Exchange rates, however, often responded to U.S. monetary-policy initiatives, so intervention to offset or reverse those exchange-rate responses can seem a contrary policy move and can create uncertainty about the strength of the System's commitment to price stability. That the U.S. Treasury maintained primary responsibility for foreign-exchange intervention only compounded this uncertainty. In addition, many FOMC participants feared that swap drawings and warehousing could contravene the Congressional appropriations process and, therefore, potentially pose a threat to System independence, a necessary condition for monetary-policy credibility