Anmerkungen:
In English
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web
Beschreibung:
A pioneering model for constructing and assessing government authority and achieving policy goals more effectivelyRegulation is frequently less successful than it could be, largely because the allocation of authority to regulatory institutions, and the relationships between them, are misunderstood. As a result, attempts to create new regulatory programs or mend under-performing ones are often poorly designed. Reorganizing Government explains how past approaches have failed to appreciate the full diversity of alternative approaches to organizing governmental authority. The authors illustrate the often neglected dimensional and functional aspects of inter-jurisdictional relations through in-depth explorations of several diverse case studies involving securities and banking regulation, food safety, pollution control, resource conservation, and terrorism prevention. This volume advances an analytical framework of governmental authority structured along three dimensions—centralization, overlap, and coordination. Camacho and Glicksman demonstrate how differentiating among these dimensions better illuminates the policy tradeoffs of organizational alternatives, and reduces the risk of regulatory failure. The book also explains how differentiating allocations of authority based on governmental function can lead to more effective regulation and governance. The authors illustrate the practical value of this framework for future reorganization efforts through the lens of climate change, an emerging and vital global policy challenge, and propose an “adaptive governance” infrastructure that could allow policy makers to embed the creation, evaluation, and adjustment of the organization of regulatory institutions into the democratic process itself
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations Used in the Text -- List of Figures -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Substantive and Functional Jurisdiction -- Chapter 2. The Dimensions of Allocations of Authority -- Chapter 3. Decentralization and the Functions of Food Regulation -- Chapter 4. The Functions of Overlapping Pollution Control Federalism -- Chapter 5. NEPA, the ESA, and the Tradeoffs of Interagency Coordination -- Chapter 6. Differentiating Centralization and Overlap in Swap Regulation -- Chapter 7. Differentiating Centralization and Coordination in National Intelligence after 9/11 -- Chapter 8. Differentiating Coordination and Overlap in Banking Regulation -- Chapter 9. Varying Climate Change Governance -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Index -- About the Authors