Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w25856
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w25856
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Mode of access: World Wide Web
Beschreibung:
In this paper we examine exclusion accomplished by a coalition of firms--frequently, a coalition of suppliers and customers--that share the benefits of exclusion. As a particular historical example, we study the Canadian sugar industry of the 1880s, which was controlled by a complex coalition of refiners and wholesalers. We assess the incentives and conduct of the parties as revealed in the records of a House of Commons inquiry into anticompetitive practices in the industry. Drawing upon this example, we identify and evaluate several doctrinal approaches to establishing antitrust liability for anticompetitive exclusionary coalitions