Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia

Medientyp: E-Book

Titel: Formal Employment and Organized Crime : Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia

Beteiligte: Khanna, Gaurav [Verfasser:in]; Medina, Carlos [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Nyshadham, Anant [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Tamayo, Jorge A. [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]

Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research

Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019

Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.3386/w26203

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Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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Anmerkungen: System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Mode of access: World Wide Web

Beschreibung: Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellín over a decade. We exploit exogenous variation in formal-sector employment around a socioeconomic-score cutoff, below which individuals receive benefits if not formally employed, to test whether a higher cost to formal-sector employment induces crime. Regression discontinuity estimates show this policy generated reductions in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in organized crime, but no effects on crimes of impulse or opportunity

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