Carvalho, Leandro
[VerfasserIn]
;
Olafsson, Arna
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Silverman, Dan
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w26328
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w26328
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Mode of access: World Wide Web
Beschreibung:
The appropriateness of many high-cost loan regulations depends on whether demand is driven by financial conditions ("misfortunes") or imperfect decisions ("mistakes"). Bank records from Iceland show borrowers are especially illiquid just before getting a loan, but that some spend the loans disproportionately on inessential items. Borrowers exhibit lower decision-making ability (DMA) in linked choice experiments: 53% of loan dollars go to the bottom 20% of the DMA distribution. Standard determinants of demand do not explain this relationship, which is also mirrored by the relationship between DMA and an unambiguous "mistake." Both misfortune and mistake thus appear to drive demand