Fang, Hanming
[VerfasserIn]
;
Li, Zhe
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Xu, Nianhang
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Yan, Hongjun
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w25300
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w25300
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Mode of access: World Wide Web
Beschreibung:
We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially private firms) headquartered in that city significantly increase their "perk spending." Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. Moreover, local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of Chairmen or CEOs of state-owned firms that are controlled by the local government. However, the Chairmen or CEOs who have connections with local government officials are less likely to be replaced