Haller, Andreas
[Verfasser:in]
;
Staubli, Stefan
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Zweimüller, Josef
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w27602
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w27602
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
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Mode of access: World Wide Web
Beschreibung:
We study the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI) and derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) DI eligibility rules and (ii) DI benefits. Causal evidence from two DI reforms in Austria generate fiscal multipliers (total over mechanical cost reductions) of 2.0-2.5 for stricter DI eligibility rules and of 1.3-1.4 for lower DI benefits. Stricter DI eligibility rules generate lower income losses (earnings + transfers), particularly at the lower end of the income distribution. Our analysis suggests that the welfare cost of rolling back the Austrian DI program is lower through tightening eligibility rules than through lowering benefits. Applying our framework to the US DI system suggests that both loosening eligibility rules, and increasing benefits, would be welfare increasing