Goldstein, Itay
[Verfasser:in]
;
Kopytov, Alexandr
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Shen, Lin
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Xiang, Haotian
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]National Bureau of Economic Research
Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w27376
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w27376
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Mode of access: World Wide Web
Beschreibung:
We study how heterogeneity in banks' asset holdings affects fragility. In the model, banks face a risk of bank runs and have to liquidate long-term assets in a common market to repay runners. Liquidation prices are depressed when many banks sell their assets at the same time. When banks are homogeneous, their selling behaviors are synchronized, and bank runs are exacerbated. We show that differentiating banks to some extent enhances the stability of all banks, even those whose asset performance ends up being weaker. Our analyses provide new insights about the regulation of banking sector's architecture and the design of government support during crises