Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data

Medientyp: E-Book

Titel: Paying Outsourced Labor : Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data

Beteiligte: Drenik, Andres [VerfasserIn]; Jäger, Simon [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Plotkin, Miguel Pascuel [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Schoefer, Benjamin [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]

Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research

Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020

Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.3386/w26891

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Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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Anmerkungen: System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Mode of access: World Wide Web

Beschreibung: We estimate how much firms differentiate pay premia between regular and outsourced workers. We study temp agency work arrangements where pay setting has previously escaped measurement because existing datasets do not report links between user firms (the workplaces where temp workers perform their labor) and temp agencies (their formal employers). We overcome this measurement challenge by leveraging unique administrative data from Argentina with such links. We estimate that temp agency workers receive 49% of the workplace-specific pay premia earned by regular workers in user firms: the midpoint between the benchmark for insiders (one) and the competitive spot-labor market benchmark (zero)

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