> Detailanzeige

Decarolis, Francesco [Verfasser:in] ; Fisman, Raymond [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Pinotti, Paolo [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Vannutelli, Silvia [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft] National Bureau of Economic Research

Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement

Literatur-
verwaltung

Zur
Merkliste

Lösche von
Merkliste

Per Whatsapp teilen

Schließen

Merkliste



Sie können Bookmarks mittels Listen verwalten, loggen Sie sich dafür bitte in Ihr SLUB Benutzerkonto ein.
  • Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement : Evidence from Italian Government Contracting
  • Beteiligte: Decarolis, Francesco [Verfasser:in]; Fisman, Raymond [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Pinotti, Paolo [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Vannutelli, Silvia [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
  • Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research
  • Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020
  • Erschienen in: NBER working paper series ; no. w28209
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.3386/w28209
  • Identifikator:
  • Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
    Mode of access: World Wide Web
  • Beschreibung: The benefits of bureaucratic discretion depend on the extent to which it is used for public benefit versus exploited for private gain. We study the relationship between discretion and corruption in Italian government procurement auctions, using a confidential database of firms and procurement officials investigated for corruption by Italian enforcement authorities. We show that discretionary procedure auctions (those awarded based on negotiated rather than open bidding) are associated with corruption only when conducted with fewer than the formally required number of bidders or employing discretionary criteria ("scoring rule" rather than first price). We further show that, while these "corruptible" discretionary auctions are chosen more often by officials who are themselves investigated for corruption, they are used less often in procurement administrations in which at least one official is investigated for corruption. These findings fit with a framework in which more discretion leads to greater efficiency as well as more opportunities for theft, and a central monitor manages this trade-off by limiting discretion for high-corruption procedures and locales. Additional results based on two standard tools for curbing corruption -- turnover and subcontracting limits -- corroborate this interpretation. Overall, our results imply that discretion may be under-utilized, given the high potential benefits as compared to the modest increment in corruption
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang