• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Guards vs vigilantes : the effect of rule enforcement strategies on sustainable use norms in common property regimes
  • Beteiligte: Breen, Trevor [Verfasser:in]; Tavoni, Alessandro [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: Bologna, Italy: Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics, [2020]
  • Erschienen in: Università di Bologna: Quaderni - working paper DSE ; 1157
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten); Illustrationen
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/6564
  • Identifikator:
  • Schlagwörter: Common Property ; Evolutionary Game Theory ; Institutions ; Punishment ; Graue Literatur
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen:
  • Beschreibung: This paper uses replicator dynamics to compare the steady states arising from two types of common property regimes - one in which over-exploiters are punished by the resource users themselves, and another where enforcement is handled by guards who collect a tax from the users. The use of guards requires a less restrictive set of parametric conditions in order to maintain an equilibrium with no over-exploiters. However, it can also stabilize an outcome in which all users over-exploit and are punished, but not enough to induce more cooperation (less resource extraction). These results can be used in guiding and structuring the formation of new common property regimes.
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang
  • Rechte-/Nutzungshinweise: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell (CC BY-NC)