Anmerkungen:
In: Econometrica, Forthcoming
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 3, 2014 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper develops a new tractable strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game played by good and bad guys. There is free entry of bad guys, who choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop and use a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. We prove that the passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high notes. Our predictions are consistent with time series and cross-sectional patterns in a unique data set that we assemble largely from the U.S. Secret Service: (1) One plus the seized/passed ratio rises in the note, but less than proportionately; (2) The passed rate rises 40-fold from $1 to $20, and levels off, dropping at higher notes; (3) Counterfeit quality rises in the note; (4) Since 1970, the seized-passed ratio is down 90%, and the passed rate is up 75%; (5) Inexpensive digital production leaped up in 1994-8; and (6) Canada's introduction of color notes temporarily nearly stopped counterfeiting