Anger, Niels
[VerfasserIn]
;
Böhringer, Christoph
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Lange, Andreas
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper ; No. 06-003
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (27 p)
Sprache:
Nicht zu entscheiden
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.875529
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2006 erstellt
Beschreibung:
In this paper we study political-economy determinants of the differentiation of environmental taxes between sectors. Using a common-agency model, we provide predictions on tax differentiation which are then tested using data from the German Ecological Tax Reform. As the reform is revenue neutral and reduces labor costs, tax differentiation is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced tax rates, but also by the groups' interest in revenue rebates to labor. Empirical data underpin our theoretical findings: A regression analysis of Germany's green tax reform explains environmental tax differentiation by the presence of sectoral interest groups. Besides market concentration and energy demand elasticities, the exposure of industries to international trade flows plays an important role in the environmental tax design