Carow, Kenneth A.
[VerfasserIn]
;
Kane, Edward J.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Narayanan, Rajesh
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:FRB of San Francisco Working Paper ; No. 2005-09
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
Sprache:
Nicht zu entscheiden
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.810844
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2005 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Previous studies of event returns surrounding bank mergers show that banks gain value in megamergers and additional value when they absorb in-market competitors. A portion of these gains has been traced to the increased bargaining power of banks vis-a-vis regulators and other competitors. We demonstrate that increased bargaining power of megabanks adversely affects loan customers of the acquired institution. Wealth losses are greater when loan customers are credit-constrained, the loan customer is smaller, or the acquisition is an in-market deal. These findings reinforce complaints that the ongoing consolidation in banking has unfavorably affected the availability of credit for smaller firms and especially capital-constrained firms