DeYoung, Robert
[VerfasserIn]
;
Spong, Kenneth
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Sullivan, Richard J.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Who's Minding the Store? Motivating and Monitoring Hired Managers at Small, Closely Held Firms
Erschienen in:FRB Chicago Working Paper ; No. 1999-17
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
Sprache:
Nicht zu entscheiden
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.205648
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 21, 2001 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We test whether the gains from hiring an outside manager exceed the principal-agent costs of owner-manager separation at 266 small, closely held U.S. commercial banks. Our results suggest that hiring an outside manager can improve a bank's profit efficiency, but that these gains depend on aligning the hired managers with owners via managerial shareholdings. We find that over-utilizing this control mechanism results in entrenchment, while under-utilization is costly in terms of foregone profits. This study provides a relatively unfettered test of mitigating principal-agent costs, because these small banks cannot rely on market forces or blocks of outside investors to monitor managers