Mergenthaler, Richard
[Verfasser:in]
;
Rajgopal, Shivaram
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Srinivasan, Suraj
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
CEO and CFO Career Penalties to Missing Quarterly Analysts Forecasts
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 10, 2012 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This study examines whether the board of directors penalizes CEOs and CFOs in the form of bonus cuts, fewer equity grants, and forced turnover for the act of barely missing the latest consensus analyst forecast and whether such penalties are consistent with efficient contracting or fixation. We find that CEOs are penalized when they just miss the latest consensus analyst forecast via bonus cuts, fewer equity grants, and forced turnover. CFOs are also penalized for just missing the latest consensus analyst forecast via bonus cuts and forced turnover, but do not appear to be penalized with fewer equity grants. Further, we find evidence suggesting that the penalties levied by the board for just missing the latest analyst forecast are more consistent with fixation than efficient contracting