Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 12, 2009 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Hillier and McColgan (2009), HM hereafter, investigate the antecedents and consequences of CEO turnover in firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the years 1993-1998. They contrast between voluntary and forced departure and the succession of an insider versus an outsider. In particular, they contrast turnover in family and non-family firms. As pointed out by Kesner and Sebora (1994), CEO turnover is somewhat of a unique event given the nature and power associated with the job, the significant visibility of the position and the change that follows, yet it is a relatively rare event and the decision is made at the board level which often is made up of a majority of outsiders. Sacking a CEO and the succession decision are some of the most important decisions a board can make. Let's examine what we know about the antecedents and consequences of CEO turnover from a long tradition of research that dates back to the early 1960s and what we learn from HM