Erschienen in:AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (46 p)
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Nicht zu entscheiden
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1102504
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 1, 2009 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We study the role of common venture capital investors in alleviating asymmetric information between public acquirers and private venture capital-backed targets. We find that acquisition announcement returns are more positive for acquisitions in which both the target and the acquirer are financed by the same venture capital firm. Similarly, having a common investor increases the likelihood that a transaction will be all equity-financed and the likelihood that an acquisition will take place. Our results suggest that common venture capital investors can form a bridge between acquiring and target firms that reduces asymmetric information associated with the transaction for both parties