Li, Kai
[VerfasserIn]
;
Ortiz-Molina, Hernan
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Zhao, Xinlei Shelly
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual-Class Firms
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2007 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We examine whether, and to what extent, shareholder voting rights affect institutional investment decisions. Our analysis compares institutional investment in dual-class firms, where multiple share classes carrying differential voting rights allow insiders to control the firm and leave outside investors with little or no control rights, to that in single-class firms, where each share carries one vote. We find that institutional ownership in dual-class firms is significantly lower than it is in single-class firms after controlling for other determinants of institutional investment. Although institutions of all types hold less of the shares of dual-class firms, this avoidance is more pronounced for long-term investors with strong fiduciary responsibilities than for short-term investors with weak fiduciary duties. Following the unification of dual-class shares into a single-class, institutional investors increase their shareholdings in the unifying firm. Overall, our results suggest that voting rights are an important determinant of institutional investment decisions