Attari, Mukarram
[Verfasser:in]
;
Mello, Antonio S.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Ruckes, Martin E.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Anmerkungen:
In: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, No. 5, pp. 2471-2511, 2005
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2005 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper develops a theory of strategic trading in markets with large influential arbitrageurs. If arbitrageurs are not very well-capitalized, margin requirements or capital constraints make their trades predictable. Other market participants can exploit this by trading against them. Competitors may even find it optimal to lend to arbitrageurs that are financially fragile; additional capital makes the arbitrageurs more viable, and lenders can reap profits from trading against them for a longer time. The strategic behavior of these market participants has implications for the functioning of financial markets. Strategic trading may produce significant price distortions, increase price manipulation activities, and trigger forced liquidations of large traders