Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 8, 2005 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a quot;strategic situationquot; is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures that are used to allocate the surplus. We model the choice problem facing a decision maker (DM) as having to choose from finitely many quot;actionsquot;. The known quot;consequencequot; of the ith action is a coalition from game f_i over a fixed set of players N_i union {d} (where d stands for the DM). Axioms are imposed on her choice as the list of consequences (f_1, . . . ,f_m) from the m actions varies. We characterize choice rules that are based on marginal contributions of the DM in general and on the Shapley Value in particular