• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: International Outsourcing under Monopolistic Competition : Winners and Losers
  • Beteiligte: Do, Viet Dung [VerfasserIn]; Van Long, Ngo [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2007]
  • Erschienen in: CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 2034
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (35 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.996797
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 2007 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: We show that, even with flexible domestic wages, international outsourcing may worsen the welfare of the home country and reduce the profits of all firms. If wages are rigid, outsourcing is welfare-improving if and only if the sum of the quot;trade creationquot; effect and the quot;exploitation effectquot; exceeds the quot;trade diversionquot; effect. A wage subsidy may improve welfare. We also extend the model to a two-period framework. Delaying outsourcing can be gainful because the fixed cost of outsourcing may fall over time. A social planner would choose a different speed of outsourcing than that achieved under laissez-faire
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang