• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Why Do Banks Hold Capital in Excess of Regulatory Requirements? A Functional Approach
  • Beteiligte: Dietrich, Diemo [Verfasser:in]; Vollmer, Uwe [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2007]
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
  • Sprache: Nicht zu entscheiden
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.562723
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2004 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang