Erschienen in:Bank of England Working Paper ; No. 293
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
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Nicht zu entscheiden
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.894883
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Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2006 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper develops a dynamic model to examine the ex-ante and ex-post implications of five policy options for resolving bank failures when the authorities cannot observe the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) held by individual banks. Under asymmetric information, we show that the first-best outcome is achievable when the authorities can close all banks that fail to raise a minimum level of new capital. But when the authorities cannot close banks and must rely on financial incentives to induce banks to liquidate their NPLs, recapitalisation using equity (Tier 1 capital) would be the second-best policy, whereas recapitalisation using subordinated debt (Tier 2 capital) is suboptimal. If the authorities do not wish to hold an equity stake in a bank, they should subsidise the liquidation of non-performing loans rather than inject subordinated debt. We also show that the cost of this subsidy can be reduced if it is offered in a menu that includes equity injection