Attar, Andrea
[VerfasserIn]
;
Majumdar, Dipjyoti
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Piaser, Gwenael
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Porteiro, Nicolas
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series ; No. 28/06
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.729933
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2006 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on pure strategies and deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold in in this setting, when finite generic games are considered. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals' payoffs. Therefore, it is still possible to restrict attention to direct mechanisms without any loss of generality even when competition over contracts is considered